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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS







UNION COUNTY COLLEGE; CYNTHIA ROEMER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-4238)
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 2, 2009
Before:  BARRY, SMITH AND GARTH, Circuit Judges





Philip Yip appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey granting summary judgment to defendants Union County College and
Cynthia Roemer.  We will affirm.
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  Yip taught biology and chemistry as an adjunct instructor at Union County
College, a public institution of higher education.  In 2004, he registered for the New
Pathway to Teaching in New Jersey, offered by the Continuing Education Division of the
college.  The program consisted of three phases.  Yip registered to take Phase I in the
summer of 2004.  When the college released the summer schedule, Yip learned that the
summer courses he was assigned to teach would overlap with Phase I of the New Pathway
course by at least one week.  Accordingly, Yip was unable to attend the first few days of
New Pathway.  Yip informed Roemer that he would be absent from the first few days of
class, and Roemer assured him it was not a problem.  Yip alleges that he never received a
syllabus for the class, and over the course of the semester, Roemer never returned any
assignments to him.  On September 2, 2004, Yip received by mail a grade of “C” for the
course.  Yip attempted to register for Phase II of the course, but he was instead instructed
to see Dean Willenbrock, who informed him that his low grade in Phase I precluded his
registration for Phase II.  Dean Willenbrock then encouraged Yip to discuss his grade
with Roemer.  Roemer emailed Yip with the grades that Yip received on all assignments,
from which Yip determined that Roemer had penalized him for missing the first two days
of class, and that he had received grades of zero for five reflective journals because, in
Roemer’s words, the journals “missed the mark.”  Yip’s failure to grasp the nature of the
assignments, Roemer suggested, stemmed from his having missed the first two days of
class.
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Yip explained his absences again and requested that he be permitted to rewrite the
five reflective journals.  On the advice of Dean Willenbrock, Roemer refused to give Yip
an opportunity to rewrite the journals.  
On September 7, 2006, Yip filed a complaint in the District Court, asserting four
claims: (1) violation of civil rights and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a and
2000d; (2) violation of due process and equal protection; (3) dereliction of duties and
negligence; and (4) pain, suffering, humiliation and embarrassment.  
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, and the District
Court granted the motion at a hearing on June 19, 2008.  The District Court determined
that the statute of limitations barred Yip’s federal claims, and that Yip had failed to
exhaust his state law claims through the procedure set forth by the New Jersey State Tort
Claims Act.  Accordingly, the District Court concluded that Yip’s complaint was time-
barred.  In the alternative, the District Court determined that Yip’s claims lacked merit
because his complaint sought judicial review of a course grade, and the court was
reluctant to interfere with a teacher’s academic judgment regarding student performance.
Yip appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the grant of summary
judgment de novo.  Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2008).  We will
affirm the grant of summary judgment only if, viewing the facts most favorably to the
non-moving party, we determine that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. 
     Yip also cites the public accommodations provision of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a,1
but this provision does not apply to his claim of race discrimination in the context of
academic assessment.  Accordingly, we do not analyze this claim or determine whether
Yip’s assertion of such a claim would be timely.  
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Id.  
We agree that Yip’s claims are untimely.  A two-year statute of limitations applies
to Yip’s constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as his claim under Title VI,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d.   See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (statute of1
limitations for personal injury claims under state law applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983); Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (claims
under § 1983 and § 2000d are governed by same statute of limitations); N.J.S.A.§ 2A:14-
2(a) (two-year statute of limitations applies to personal injury claims).  
Yip admitted that he learned of his “C” grade on September 2, 2004, and that he
did not file suit until September 7, 2006.  Although Yip argues that he attempted to
redress the low grade after September 2, 2004, we note that the statute of limitations
begins as soon as the plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned that she has been
injured and is not tolled until the last day that her curative efforts fail.  See Mest v. Cabot
Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 510 (3d Cir. 2006).  Therefore, Yip’s claims for violations of due
process and equal protection are time-barred.
As for his state law claims for dereliction of duty, negligence and pain, suffering
and embarrassment, the District Court properly determined that these claims arose under
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state tort law, and that Yip had not satisfied the time and notice requirements under the
NJTCA.  See N.J.S.A. § 59:8-8 (requiring a plaintiff to notify a public entity within 90
days of learning of an injury).  This notice provision is a prerequisite to suit, except in
circumstances not applicable here, and no claim can be brought more than two years after
accrual.  Id.  As Yip failed to comply with the notice requirements under state law and
filed his complaint after more than two years had passed from the date his claims accrued,
summary judgment was also proper as to his state law claims.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.  
